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THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE 
IRRELEVANCE-OF-MOTIVE MAXIM 
MICHAEL T. ROSENBERG† 
ABSTRACT 
  The irrelevance-of-motive maxim—the longstanding principle that 
a defendant’s motives are irrelevant to criminal liability—has come 
under attack. Critics of this maxim claim that “motives,” under any 
plausible conception of the term, are in fact relevant in the criminal 
law. According to these critics, the only way to defend the truth of the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim is to render it true by definition, by 
defining motive as the subcategory of intentions that are irrelevant to 
criminal liability. This Note defends the irrelevance-of-motive maxim 
by applying a plausible conception of “motive” that conforms to the 
historical meaning of the term. With the proper definition in place, the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim can be understood as stating a valid 
principle of criminal law, defied only by the advent of a certain kind 
of bias crime legislation. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[A]lthough a good motive might mitigate punishment (or 
[discourage] prosecution), and a bad motive might aggravate 
punishment (or [encourage] prosecution), it is a truism within 
orthodoxy that motive has no bearing on liability itself.”1 According 
to Professor Jerome Hall, “hardly any part of penal law is more 
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 1. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (1987) (altered to correct 
the source’s transposition of the words “encourage” and “discourage”). 
06__ROSENBERG.DOC 4/16/2008  8:37:21 AM 
1144 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1143 
definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant.”2 The “irrelevance-of-
motive maxim”3—the claim that one’s motives are irrelevant to 
criminal liability—has received increasing attention in light of the 
modern debate over hate crime, or bias crime,4 legislation. For 
example, the Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme Courts both cited the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim to support their decisions, later reversed 
by the United States Supreme Court, to strike down bias crime 
statutes as unconstitutional.5 Yet despite judicial reliance on this 
maxim, and despite Professor Hall’s characterization of it as an 
unquestioned principle of law, the irrelevance-of-motive maxim has 
come under attack6 from normative, empirical, and logical criticisms.7 
The normative criticisms ask why motive should be irrelevant to 
criminal liability, in light of motive’s relevance to questions of moral 
culpability.8 The empirical criticisms assert that motive is relevant to 
criminal liability,9 and even when irrelevant to liability itself, that 
motive nevertheless exerts a more subtle influence, affecting how 
prosecutors,10 judges,11 and juries12 apply the law. The logical criticisms 
 
 2. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2d ed. 1960) (emphasis 
added) (citing State v. Logan, 126 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1939) (per curiam)). 
 3. Although the phrase “irrelevance-of-motive maxim” is used consistently throughout 
this Note, there is no generally agreed upon description of this principle. This phrase, sans 
hyphens, was used by Professor Guyora Binder in his article The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 passim (2002). 
 4. The term “bias crime” is used throughout this Note instead of “hate crime” because 
those who commit bias crimes do not necessarily hate their victims. See FREDERICK M. 
LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE 9 (1999) (defending the term “bias crime” for this reason). For a 
discussion on the distinction between statutes that require a racial animus and those that merely 
require differential selection of victims of a particular group, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 5. See State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 452–56 (Ohio 1992) (invalidating a bias crime 
statute because it wrongly punished motive), vacated, 508 U.S. 969 (1993) (mem.); State v. 
Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 813 & n.11–12 (Wis. 1992) (discussing the distinction between motive 
and intention to show that the statute improperly concerns motive), rev’d, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
 6. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 89, 90 (2006) (“[T]his familiar law school picture of motive as essentially irrelevant is 
increasingly wrong descriptively and is also wrong normatively.”). 
 7. Binder, supra note 3, at 45. 
 8. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 144 (“Nothing written by moral philosophers supports the 
unimportance of motive.”). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 146 (“The reason why the defendant breaks and enters is crucial in 
characterizing his conduct as a burglary. Forgery, kidnapping, criminal libel, and conspiracy 
provide other examples, and the list could be expanded at great length.”). 
 10. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW 231 (2d ed. 1986) 
(asserting that motive is relevant to the procedural aspects of criminal law). 
 11. See Antony Duff, Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law: Motives and 
Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 156, 171 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) 
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of the maxim question the coherence of proposed distinctions 
between motives and intentions, and seek to prevent defenders of the 
maxim from rendering it true by definition.13 
Taken together, the logical and empirical criticisms contend that 
“no distinction could be drawn between motive and intent that would 
make the irrelevance of motive claim descriptively true, as opposed to 
true only by definition.”14 In other words, the maxim is either false or 
vacuous. Professor Douglas Husak contends that “according to any 
plausible conception” of what motive means, motive can be shown to 
be relevant to criminal liability.15 Husak thus calls for an 
abandonment of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim,16 which he claims 
has had a “pernicious impact” on the law.17 
This Note accepts Professor Husak’s challenge. It defends the 
truth of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim by applying a conception of 
motive that is not only “plausible,” but that conforms to the historical 
meaning of the term. Part I explains the conceptions of motive 
espoused by two of the most influential commentators on the topic, 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and Professor Jerome Hall, and defends 
the success of their explanations in coherently distinguishing between 
motives and intentions. Part II demonstrates the inadequacy of the 
predominant view of motive, which defines motive as a species of 
intention. Applying Hall’s conception of motive, Part III argues that 
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is alive and well. Motive is indeed 
irrelevant to criminal liability, with one exception: certain bias crime 
statutes do make motive relevant to criminal liability. In light of the 
maxim’s continued validity, participants in the debate over bias 
 
(“Courts can acquit defendants with whose motives they sympathise, by redescribing their 
intentions in terms of their motives to make it appear that they did not act with the appropriate 
criminal intention.”). 
 12. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 231 (“The jury, if the defendant’s good motive 
comes to its attention, might exercise its uncontrolled discretion to acquit.” (footnote omitted)). 
 13. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 
(1989) (“The most effective (but least satisfactory) means to guarantee the accuracy of [the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim] is to construe it as a necessary truth. . . . But [this] thesis is 
substantive, and is trivialized when construed as a tautology.”). 
 14. Binder, supra note 3, at 45. 
 15. Husak, supra note 13, at 5. 
 16. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 148. 
 17. See id. (remarking, in reference to benevolent euthanasia cases in which the 
defendant’s good motives were ignored, that “[i]t is monstrous that a defendant should be 
convicted of the most serious offense known to the criminal law when he loving and regretfully 
complies with a request to kill his suffering and incurable spouse”). 
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crimes should recognize just how exceptional these new crimes are in 
the criminal law. 
I.  MOTIVE AS WHOLLY DISTINCT FROM INTENTION 
The distinction between intention and motive is far from settled. 
“It might be thought that a clear distinction between intention and 
motive can be drawn, given the radical difference in treatment that 
follows from categorizing a mental state as one or the other. In fact, 
however, the distinction has long bedeviled law students and criminal 
theorists alike.”18 Nevertheless, despite such confusion, a clear 
distinction between motive and intention does exist. The view of 
motive defended here—that motive refers not to intended 
consequences, but to the reason those consequences are desirable to 
the actor—is best understood through the writings of two influential 
proponents of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim: Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen and Professor Jerome Hall. Although the two theorists held 
slightly different conceptions of motive, they both viewed motive as a 
concept wholly distinct from intention—meaning that a motive could 
never be an intention, or vice versa. This Part explains Stephen’s and 
Hall’s distinctions between motive and intention, and then embraces 
Hall’s distinction,19 defending its logical coherence. 
A. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s View 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen is regarded as one of the “most 
influential exponents of the irrelevance of motive maxim.”20 Although 
his explanation has been misread,21 Stephen was clear that intentions 
are neither “synonymous with motives” nor a broader category that 
includes motives and nonmotives.22 
 
 18. Id. at 144. 
 19. This Note specifically defends Hall’s view because it is both more sensible and better 
explained than Stephen’s view and because the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is often viewed as 
“Hall’s thesis.” See, e.g., Husak, supra note 13, at 4 (referring to the maxim as “Hall’s thesis”). 
 20. Binder, supra note 3, at 37 (referring to Victorian-era British judge and historian Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as the two most 
influential exponents of the maxim). 
 21. See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text for an explanation of how Stephen’s 
distinction between motive and intentions has been misread. 
 22. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 110–12 
(1883).  
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1. The Two Fallacies of Which Stephen Warns.  In his 1883 work 
History of the Criminal Law of England, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen 
warns “against two common fallacies, namely, the confusion between 
motive and intention, and [second,] the tendency to deny an 
immediate intention because of the existence, real or supposed, of 
some ulterior intention.”23 Understanding what Stephen means by 
these “fallacies” illustrates two fundamental principles about 
intentions in the criminal law. The first principle is that motive is 
irrelevant in the criminal law—the irrelevance-of-motive maxim. The 
other principle asserts the irrelevance of a more “ulterior intention.”24 
According to this second principle, just as one’s most ultimate 
intention is irrelevant to criminal liability, so too are any intentions 
more ultimate than those included in a crime’s mens rea requirement. 
That is, even if one’s most ultimate goal is to save the world, this does 
not save one’s actions from criminality. The confusion surrounding 
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim can ultimately be explained as 
resulting from the conflation of these two distinct principles.25 
Following a cursory discussion of the fallacies Stephen addresses, Part 
I.A.2 elaborates on the distinction between the two. 
The first fallacy Stephen warns of is the subject of this Note: the 
confusion between motives and intentions. Stephen identifies an 
actor’s motive as “the prevailing feeling in his mind at the time when 
he acted rather than the desire to produce the particular result which 
his conduct was intended to produce.”26 To explain this distinction, 
Stephen presents the following illustration: 
A puts a loaded pistol to B’s temple and shoots B through the head 
deliberately, and knowing that the pistol is loaded and that the 
wound must certainly be mortal. It is obvious that in every such case 
the intention of A must be to kill B. On the other hand, the act in 
itself throws no light whatever on A’s motives for killing B. . . . They 
may have been mixed in all imaginable degrees. The motive may 
have been a desire for revenge, or a desire for plunder, or a wish on 
A’s part to defend himself against an attack by B, or a desire to kill 
an enemy in battle, or to put a man already mortally wounded out of 
 
 23. Id. at 111. 
 24. This second principle is discussed further in Part I.A.2. 
 25. See infra Part I.A.2 for an explanation of how Stephen’s distinction between motive 
and intention has been misread as a distinction between proximate and ultimate intentions. 
 26. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 110. 
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his agony. In all these cases the intention is the same, but the 
motives are different . . . .27 
It would be easy to interpret Stephen’s first fallacy as saying motive 
means a more ulterior intention, and because more ulterior intentions 
are irrelevant, motives are irrelevant. Under a correct reading of 
Stephen, however, motive should be understood as distinct from 
intentions altogether. To see this, consider the second fallacy Stephen 
describes. 
The second potential fallacy is that of excusing a prohibited 
intention based on the existence of some ulterior intention. To 
illustrate this point, Stephen discusses the case of Rex v. Woodburne 
and Coke,28 an English case in which the defendants were charged 
with wounding another “with intent to maim and disfigure.”29 One 
defendant claimed to be innocent of this crime because he did not 
intend to disfigure the victim, but rather to kill him.30 Stephen 
explained, however, that the legal concept of “intention” does not 
refer only to the most ultimate intended consequence of an action, 
but to all consequences sought as a means to achieving the ultimate 
end.31 Thus, Stephen asserted that the jury was properly instructed to 
determine whether disfiguring the victim was a consequence that the 
defendant had desired as a means of achieving his ultimate goal of 
murder.32 
2. Distinguishing between the Two Fallacies.  Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen’s discussion of these two fallacies—confusing 
motive with intention and mistakenly believing that ulterior 
intentions are relevant—points to a third potential pitfall: 
 
 27. Id. at 110–11. 
 28. THE TRIAL OF JOHN WOODBURNE AND ARUNDEL COKE, ESQ. AT SUFFOLK ASSIZES, 
FOR FELONY, IN WILLFULLY SLITTING THE NOSE OF EDWARD CRISPE, GENT. (* 8 GEORGE I. 
A.D. 1722), reprinted in 16 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS 
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM EARLIEST PERIOD TO 
THE YEAR 1783 WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, at 53 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2000) 
(T.B. Howell comp., T.C. Hansard 1812).  
 29. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 112. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 110–11 (rejecting the view that only the ultimate intentions are relevant and 
suggesting that one’s intentions can be inferred from the natural consequences of one’s actions). 
 32. Id. at 112 (instructing the jury to “consider whether the means made use of to effect 
and accomplish that murder and the consequence of those means were not in the intention and 
design of the party; whether every blow and cut and the consequences thereof were not 
intended, as well as the end for which it is alleged the blows and cuts were given”). 
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misconstruing the two fallacies as one and the same. The mistake 
results from interpreting Stephen’s examples of motives—“a wish on 
A’s part to defend himself against an attack by B, or a desire to kill an 
enemy in battle,” and so forth—as examples of intended 
consequences.33 Professor Guyora Binder falls prey to this pitfall, 
claiming that Stephen views motives as “desired ends.”34 That this 
interpretation is a misreading can best be illustrated through a 
concrete example. 
In a hypothetical based on the Woodburne case described in Part 
I.A.1,35 Donny Defendant strikes Victor Victim seven times on his 
face and head with a knife. Further, suppose that Donny’s intended 
consequences for this action can be listed, in order from most 
temporally proximate to temporally ultimate, as follows: (1) Victor’s 
face and head suffer cuts and other injuries, (2) Victor is severely 
injured, and (3) Victor dies. 
Assuming that this is a complete list of the consequences Donny 
intended, what was his motive for the assault? According to Stephen’s 
view, the reader should have no idea. For Stephen, motive is not an 
intended consequence of the action. Motive is “the prevailing feeling 
in [the defendant’s] mind at the time when he acted rather than the 
desire to produce the particular result which his conduct was intended 
to produce.”36 Although the list of Donny’s intended consequences 
rules out certain possible motives, many others remain.37 For example, 
Donny may have attacked Victor out of bloodlust, a desire for 
revenge, or to minimize Victor’s suffering. 
These descriptions of potential motives form the potential source 
of confusion. One might think that what Stephen calls “motives” can 
be redescribed in terms of intended consequences—interpreting 
“having a desire for revenge” as meaning “having the intended 
 
 33. Id. at 111. 
 34. Binder, supra note 3, at 38–40 (“For Stephen, intentions are compound mental states, 
combining volitions and expectations. They are consequences not merely desired, but chosen or 
accepted, as the likely consequences of acts that are chosen. Thus, there are intentions 
(expected consequences of acts) that are not motives, because not desired. And there are 
motives (desired ends) that are not intentions, because not acted upon.”). 
 35. In the Woodburne case, “Woodburne, at Coke’s instigation, struck Crispe about the 
head and face with a billhook seven distinct blows.” STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 112 (discussing 
THE TRIAL OF JOHN WOODBURNE AND ARUNDEL COKE, ESQ. AT SUFFOLK ASSIZES, FOR 
FELONY, IN WILLFULLY SLITTING THE NOSE OF EDWARD CRISPE, GENT., supra note 28). The 
defense of intending murder rather than disfigurement was offered by Coke. Id. 
 36. Id. at 110. 
 37. See infra Part III.A for a defense of this claim. 
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consequence of achieving revenge.” In the Donny hypothetical, 
however, achieving revenge is not a separate consequence following 
from Victor’s death; it is simply a different characterization of the 
same event. This is the distinction between motive and intention.38 
Intention refers to the events the defendant sought to bring about 
whereas motive refers to a subjective reason the defendant desired to 
bring about those events. 
With this distinction in mind, notice that Stephen’s two fallacies 
identify two distinct categories of irrelevant information. The first 
fallacy points to the irrelevance of motive. As applied to the Donny 
example, it is irrelevant whether Donny assaulted Victor out of 
bloodlust or to minimize Victor’s suffering. As far as the criminal law 
is concerned, Donny intended and attempted to kill a human being; 
his motive for doing so is simply not relevant. The second fallacy 
asserts the irrelevance of a more ulterior intention. Assuming Victor 
survived the attack, it is irrelevant whether or not maiming him was 
Donny’s ultimate goal. So long as Donny intended to maim Victor in 
the process of seeking his ultimate goal,39 Donny “intended” to maim 
him. Stephen’s two fallacies illustrate two separate principles of 
criminal law. 
3. Why Stephen Says Motive Should Be Irrelevant.  Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen offers three “conclusive” reasons why motive 
should not be relevant to criminal liability.40 First, defendants’ 
motives do not affect the harm that their actions have on society:41 
 
 38. This conclusion is consistent with Stephen’s discussion, STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 
110–12, 119–21; however, the distinction between separate events and separate characterizations 
of the same event was added to make sense of Stephen’s conclusion, and is further discussed 
infra in Section I.C. Even with this addition, Stephen did not view motive as an ulterior 
intention; otherwise, his two fallacies would be one and the same. See id. at 111 (labelling the 
confusion between motive and intention a separate fallacy from the mistake of ignoring an 
immediate intention because of the existence of a more ultimate one). 
 39. This determination would depend upon whether it qualifies as “maiming” to disfigure 
someone for the short interval between an assault and death. 
 40. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 121. 
 41. Id. Contemporary commentators debate whether a motive of racial prejudice can 
exacerbate the harm of a defendant’s crime. Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 
(1993) (“[A]ccording to the State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to 
provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite 
community unrest.”), and LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 39–44 (arguing that bias crimes, 
compared to their unbiased counterparts, are “far more likely to be violent,” cause greater 
“psychophysiological symptoms,” ignite “inter-community tensions,” and cause stigmatization, 
which brings about “humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred”), with Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. 
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[O]ne great object of criminal law is to prevent certain acts which 
are injurious to society. But the mischief of an act depends upon the 
intention, not upon the motives of the agent. If a man intentionally 
burns down a house, or intentionally wounds the owner, the 
injury . . . is equally great, whether the offender’s motive was or was 
not one in which the public in general would be inclined to 
sympathise.42 
Second, Stephen says “it is impossible to determine with any 
approach to precision . . . a man’s motive for any given act. They are 
always mixed, and they generally vary.”43 Third, Stephen claims that 
because of the first two reasons, even if motive is made doctrinally 
relevant, it will not become relevant in fact. He defends this 
conclusion by reference to “malice.” 
Although the word “malice” means “wickedness,” and therefore 
does invoke the concept of motive, “the word seldom if ever bears its 
natural sense.”44 Stephen explains how, to avoid the problems of 
punishing motives, the term “malice” is defined through legal fictions 
that avoid reference to motives. 
Malice is divided into ‘express’ malice and ‘constructive’ or ‘implied’ 
malice, or, as it is sometimes called, ‘malice in law’ and ‘malice in 
fact.’ The effect of this fiction is that bad motives are by a rule of law 
imputed where intentional misconduct not prompted by bad motives 
is proved.45 
In other words, although the term “malice” invokes a defendant’s 
motives, the criminal law operationally defines “malice” through 
other legal constructs that do not involve motive.46 The word malice 
 
Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1085–93 (2004) (“It is not 
hatred and bias, as such, that hurt; rather it is the perception of hatred and bias that hurts. . . . So 
if the psychic trauma to victims of hate/bias crimes is thought to be the gravaman [sic]of the 
offense, then the law should not be concerned with the motive of the offender, but rather, with 
the perception of the defendant’s motive by the victim.”). 
 42. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 121. The reasons for punishing intentional harms differently 
from harms produced accidentally fall outside the scope of this note. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 119–20 (explaining that the reason “malice” is never applied in accord with its 
natural meaning is because the term invokes the concept of motive). 
 45. Id. at 121. 
 46. This pattern has been repeated with regard to bias crimes statutes. See infra notes 173–
76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way statutory bias crime language that 
references a defendant’s motives can be operationally defined through legal concepts that 
inquire only into a defendant’s intentions. 
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therefore fails to retain its natural meaning in the law, and Stephen 
suggests that “if the law were codified it might with great advantage 
be altogether omitted from the criminal law.”47 
To Stephen, motive should thus be irrelevant because: (1) it is 
unrelated to the degree an actor has harmed society; (2) it is almost 
impossible to determine; and (3) even if a legal concept were to 
invoke a defendant’s motives, such as the concept of malice, the first 
two considerations would persuade judges to adopt a motive-free 
interpretation of that concept. 
B. Professor Jerome Hall’s View 
In 1947, Professor Jerome Hall reiterated the validity of the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim.48 Although the maxim’s truth had been 
challenged by that time, Hall explained that this critique resulted 
from an unfortunate conflation of motive and intention.49 Hall blamed 
Sir John William Salmond for the mistaken view that motive is a 
species of intention.50 Without explanation or citation, Salmond had 
defined “motive” as an “ulterior intent,” and thus had concluded that 
there are many exceptions to the general principle that motive is 
irrelevant.51 Take the example of burglary, which Salmond defined as 
“breaking and entering a dwelling-house by night with intent to 
commit a felony therein.”52 Under Salmond’s view, a motive is any 
ulterior intention, and thus an intent to commit a felony once inside 
the dwelling constitutes a “motive” for breaking and entering.53 
Salmond concluded that motive is indeed relevant for burglary, as 
well as for criminal attempts, forgery, defamation, malicious 
prosecution, and the defense of necessity.54 
Hall explains that these categories would never have been 
construed as exceptions to the irrelevance-of-motive maxim had 
Salmond applied the “usual distinction between intention and 
motive.”55 In reference to the burglary example: 
 
 47. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 120. 
 48. HALL, supra note 2, at 83–93 (arguing that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability). 
 49. Id. at 85. 
 50. Id. at 85–87 (“Salmond’s views have had considerable influence in this country . . . .”). 
 51. JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 343–48 (4th ed. 1913). 
 52. Id. at 346. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 343–48. 
 55. HALL, supra note 2, at 86. 
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The breaking may have been in order to enter, the entry in order to 
steal, the stealing in order to get money to buy things, the buying of 
things to effect other objectives. But it does not aid analysis to 
designate the various subsequent intentions or the final “ulterior” 
one a “motive.” 
That an intention is beyond or “ulterior” to the scope of legal 
relevance does not transform it into a motive in the generally 
accepted legal sense of the term.56 
For Hall, in contrast, “intention . . . refers to the objective effect 
which the law-breaker contrives to produce on others by his act or 
omission, and . . . motive refers to the subjective effect and its 
accompanying emotion which he desires to produce on himself.”57 
Motive is “a ground or reason for action.”58 Hall’s use of the word 
“reason” is instructive. A “motive” is not a driving force that compels 
a person’s actions.59 Hall says “[i]t is doubtful whether one is 
responsible for his motives; but the crucial point for legal purposes is 
that action involves a choice.”60 Thus, Hall distinguishes the legal use 
of “motive” from psychiatrists’ understanding of “motive” as a 
scientific cause.61 
Hall insightfully explains the source of Salmond’s confusion. 
Although Salmond and his followers were right to identify “motive” 
with the question of why a person acted as he or she did, they 
confused different types of answers to “why” questions because of the 
ambiguity of the word.62 For Hall, “motive answers the question why, 
neither in terms of causation nor in those of a further ulterior 
 
 56. Id. at 87. 
 57. Id. at 90 n.79 (quoting W. Norwood East, Murder, from the Point of View of the 
Psychiatrist, 3 MED.-LEGAL & CRIM. REV. 69–70 (1935)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 58. Id. at 92. 
 59. See id. at 89 n.77 (“In the legal view, there is no compulsion or necessity in the action of 
normal persons.”). 
 60. Id. at 90. 
 61. Id. at 89. 
 62. See id. (“In a formal way [Salmond and his followers] recognized the difference 
between asking what a person did, i.e. to ascertain whether he acted, and why he acted that way. 
But they did not adhere to the ordinary and legal difference between these ideas. For when they 
asked ‘why did a person do a particular act’? they proceeded to answer it in terms of an 
objective which he sought, an intention oriented towards the future, a purpose, which they 
called ‘motive.’ The ambiguity of ‘why’ implemented their predilection.”). These different types 
of “why” are discussed infra in Part I.C. 
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objective, but in terms that give a reason which is the subject of an 
ethical appraisal.”63 
As discussed in Part III, the choice between Salmond’s and 
Hall’s definitions is crucial to whether the irrelevance-of-motive 
maxim is rendered descriptively true or false. If the “motive” for an 
action is any ulterior intention of that act, then burglary indeed makes 
use of “motive.” If Hall’s and Stephen’s conceptions are correct, 
however, the offense of burglary does not implicate motive, given that 
a burglar burglarizes whether driven by hunger or a thirst for 
adventure. 
In addition to defending motive’s empirical irrelevance to 
criminal law, Hall defends the view that motive should be irrelevant 
to criminal liability. Hall does not defend this view by claiming that 
motive is irrelevant to moral culpability.64 On the contrary, he says 
moral culpability cannot be determined unless both intention and 
motive are considered: 
For example, D kills T; all agree that what he did is morally wrong. 
But the appraisal of D’s moral culpability must also take account of 
his motive: was D acting from cupidity, knowing he was named the 
chief beneficiary of T’s will? Or was the motive his love for his sick 
wife who needed an operation? . . . [W]e cannot pass an adequate 
moral judgment if we know only what harm has been committed but 
not the motive for committing it . . . .65 
Hall recognizes that excluding motives when determining 
criminal liability sometimes results in outcomes that are out of 
balance with morality.66 But he says these outcomes must be tolerated 
because the alternative would be to make the substantive rules 
vague.67 “[T]he preservation of the objective meaning of . . . mens rea 
as well as of the attendant principle of legality has its price. For it is 
impossible to forbid any class of harms without including rare 
marginal instances where . . . the value protected by the rule was not 
impaired in that instance.”68 Hall insists that the moral judgment 
imposed by the penal law must be absolute, so as to encourage 
 
 63. HALL, supra note 2, at 93. 
 64. Id. at 93–94. 
 65. Id. at 93. 
 66. See id. at 95–96 (recognizing the problems that arise in “marginal cases” and suggesting 
that these inequitable outcomes be mitigated). 
 67. Id. at 95. 
 68. Id. at 94. 
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conformity to the law.69 If a particular outcome seems inequitable, 
Hall says lawmakers can redefine criminal laws to account for this 
exceptional situation without making reference to motive.70 
Hall also stresses that making motive relevant to criminal 
liability would require the finder of fact to make difficult 
determinations about a defendant’s motive.71 Even when not 
impossible, the task of determining a person’s motive can be arduous, 
sometimes requiring a “detailed case-history of the defendant’s past 
life.”72 Even if one’s motive could be established, judges and juries 
would then have to pass judgment on whether the motive was good or 
bad,73 thus stripping objectivity from the principle of mens rea.74 
Despite this firm stance on motive’s irrelevance to criminal 
liability, Hall lets motive in the back door. When confronted with a 
Jean Valjean,75 Hall recommends the use of official discretion, such as 
foregoing prosecution or suspending a sentence, to provide a “safety 
valve” to rectify the injustice created by unsympathetic substantive 
rules.76 Achieving this result informally “preserves the principles of 
mens rea and legality in the vast majority of cases.”77 To Hall, 
allocating questions of motive to the administration of justice is 
greatly preferable to making motive doctrinally relevant, which would 
depreciate “both penal law and its ethical significance by making the 
relevant rules vague.”78 
 
 69. Id. at 94–95. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 99. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 104. 
 75. Jean Valjean is a character in Les Misérables who went to prison for breaking a window 
pane and stealing a loaf of bread to feed his family. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES 95 
(Norman Denny trans., Penguin Books 1982) (1862). 
 76. HALL, supra note 2, at 104; accord Hessick, supra note 6, at 92 & nn.6–10 (discussing 
the famous case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, R v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 
273, in which the defendant sailors, having cannibalized one of their own to survive at sea, only 
served six months in prison despite receiving death sentences, id.). 
 77. HALL, supra note 2, at 95. On the relevance of motive, it appears that “[t]he Law In 
Action is as malleable as The Law On The Books is uncompromising.” HUSAK, supra note 1, at 
148 (quoting Yale Kamisar, Some Nonreligious Views Against Proposed “Mercy Killing” 
Legislation: A Rejoinder, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 971 (1958)). 
 78. Id. 
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C. Motive and Intention Are Conceptually Distinct under This View 
Both Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and Professor Jerome Hall 
agree that motive is an entirely distinct concept from intention.79 
Although their views are similar, they are not identical. Stephen 
identifies motive as the prevailing feeling in the actor’s mind,80 
whereas Hall identifies it as the subjective effect that actor seeks to 
produce upon himself by acting.81 This Note specifically defends 
Hall’s view because it is both more sensible and better explained, and 
because the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is often viewed as “Hall’s 
thesis.”82 
According to Professor Douglas Husak, “the claim that 
intentions describe while motives explain cannot be assessed without 
sophisticated theories of descriptions and explanations, and no 
criminal theorist has yet produced them.”83 Although this Note does 
not connect the distinction between motive and intentions to a grand 
epistemological scheme, this Section explains and defends Hall’s 
distinction as logically coherent by expounding on the difference 
between the two concepts. The further question of whether this 
definition saves the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is discussed in Part 
III. 
As Hall indicates, questions asking “why” something happened 
the way it did are susceptible to several types of answers.84 One type 
of explanation would be a scientific one. To explain why a billiard ball 
fell into the corner pocket, one could combine information about 
natural laws with information about the states (masses, velocities, 
locations, etc.) of the balls at a given time to explain why the ball 
acted the way it did. Regardless of whether human behaviors are 
theoretically susceptible to this type of deterministic explanation, the 
criminal law presumes otherwise—assuming that every lawbreaker 
possessed the power to choose to obey the law.85 
 
 79. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 80. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 82. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 13, at 4–6 (labeling the assertion that motive is irrelevant in 
the criminal law “Hall’s thesis”). 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hall’s view on the 
ambiguity of “why.” 
 85. HALL, supra note 2, at 89 n.77 (“In the legal view, there is no compulsion or necessity 
in the action of normal persons.”). 
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A different sort of explanation is required whenever examining 
“why” a defendant took a particular course of action in the context of 
the criminal law. To understand why a defendant took the action he 
did, the explanation proceeds in terms of intended consequences, 
with each intention explaining the preceding intention. Donny’s act of 
striking Victor’s face is explained by the fact that Donny intended to 
seriously injure his victim. His intention to seriously injure Victor is 
explained by his further intention to kill Victor. But what explains 
that intention? Given that, based on the facts of the hypothetical, 
Donny intends no consequences beyond Victor’s death,86 this 
intended consequence cannot be explained by reference to a more 
ultimate one. Each step in this explanation merely pushes the 
question back a level. 
The ultimate intended consequence can only be explained by 
reference to the actor’s motive—for example, a desire for revenge. 
This last piece of information does not resolve every possible 
question about Donny’s actions. One could still wonder why Donny 
believed cuts to the face would be deadly or why Donny thought 
revenge could be achieved through Victor’s death. Nevertheless, as 
Hall stresses, the motive helps explain the “reason” for Donny’s 
actions.87 
One possible objection to this distinction between motives and 
intentions is that “achieving revenge” is not conceptually different 
from “severely injuring Victor” or any of Donny’s other intended 
consequences. According to this argument, the Donny/Victor 
hypothetical begs the question because it defines Donny’s motive of 
“achieving revenge” as something other than an intention by 
excluding it from the so-called complete list of intended 
consequences. The question raised by this criticism is whether 
“achieving revenge” is indeed a different sort of thing from Donny’s 
intended consequences. It is. Notice that each of the intended 
consequences, or “intentions,” is an event. Each one temporally 
follows the preceding one.88 As such, the method of explaining one 
 
 86. See supra Part I.A.2 for a complete list of intended consequences and a description of 
Victor’s death as the most ulterior intention. 
 87. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 88. It is not true that all intended consequences must occur at different times. With a more 
complicated (and thus more realistic) example, the set of intended consequences would not 
proceed as a single chain of events, each having but one effect. Rather, any ordinary action 
would have many effects, and each of these effects would have many consequences of its own. It 
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intention by reference to another is to explain how Donny expected 
the earlier event to bring about the later event. This pattern would be 
broken if “achieving revenge” were added to the chain of intended 
consequences. “Achieving revenge” was not an event Donny 
expected to follow Victor’s death, but rather a characterization of 
Victor’s death that had special meaning to Donny. As Hall says, 
“[t]he reference of ‘motive’ . . . is to the actor, whereas intention is 
directed outside him.”89 The concepts of motive and intention are thus 
conceptually distinct. The word “intention . . . refers to the objective 
effect which the law-breaker contrives to produce on others by his act 
or omission, and . . . motive refers to the subjective effect and its 
accompanying emotion which he desires to produce on himself.”90 
The view of motive discussed in this Part is not only historically 
supported by Stephen’s and Hall’s discussions, but also creates a 
conceptually coherent distinction between motive and intent. Before 
examining the truth of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim in light of 
this distinction,91 Part II shows that other proposed definitions of 
motive either fail to identify a conceptually distinct concept, or bear 
little relation to the original legal term. 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF OTHER DEFINITIONS OF MOTIVE 
In contrast to the view presented in Part I, which defines motive 
as a conceptually distinct category from intention,92 other views define 
motives and intentions in such a way that the categories overlap.93 
 
is certainly possible for two such consequences to occur at the same time. The important point is 
that they would be separate events, not differing characterizations of the same event. 
 89. HALL, supra note 2, at 90 (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 90 n.79 (quoting W. Norwood East, Murder, from the Point of View of the 
Psychiatrist, 3 MED.-LEGAL & CRIM. REV. 69–70 (1935)).  
 91. See infra Part III. 
 92. Hyman Gross’s definition of motive appears to also fall into the category of those that 
classify motives as conceptually distinct from intentions. See HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 111 (1979) (distinguishing motives from intentions in that motives do not 
have a beginning and an end and that motive is an explanation of an action, not a description of 
it). Gross uses this illustration: “If a rich man has an ugly daughter, he is concerned about her 
suitor’s motives. But a poor man with a beautiful daughter is concerned about her suitor’s 
intentions.” Id. However, the specifics of Gross’s conception of motive are not clear from this 
illustration or from his description of motive. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 145–46 (“[T]his 
account . . . does not make sense of Gross’s own example.”); Whitley R. P. Kaufman, Motive, 
Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 322 (2003) (claiming 
Gross’s illustration “haunts” the discussion of motive). 
 93. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 92, at 322–23 (describing the approach of defining 
motive as an ulterior intention). 
06__ROSENBERG.DOC 4/16/2008  8:37:21 AM 
2008] IRRELEVANCE-OF-MOTIVE MAXIM 1159 
These definitions trivialize the irrelevance-of-motive maxim. 
Although a successful distinction between motive and intention need 
not render the maxim true, it should at least make sense of why the 
maxim has been so adamantly defended.94 These definitions, by 
overlapping the concepts of motives and intentions, render the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim either (1) incoherent, (2) so trivially 
false that it never should have been uttered, or (3) a mere renaming 
of some different principle of law altogether. 
A. The Problems with Conflating Motive and Intention 
Contemporary views that conflate motive with intention fall into 
two categories.95 Under the first approach, motive is defined as a 
special type of intention. “The most common way of distinguishing 
[motive from intention] is to hold that a motive, even if it is a sort of 
intention, is distinguished from other intentions in that it is ‘ulterior’ 
or ‘ultimate[]’ . . . .”96 Under this view, motive is the “the intention 
with which an intentional act is done. Intention, when distinguished 
from motive, relates to the means, motive to the end.”97 Under the 
second approach, motive is identified as a broader category that 
includes some intentions, but that also includes elements other than 
intentions—anything that can provide a reason for the defendant’s 
actions.98 Professor Douglas Husak, for example, describes motive as 
a “polymorphous collection of action initiators,” which includes both 
intentions and non-intentions.99 Under either of these approaches, the 
concepts of motive and intention overlap such that at least some 
 
 94. Recall Hall’s claim that “hardly any part of penal law is more definitely settled than 
that motive is irrelevant.” HALL, supra note 2, at 88 (citing State v. Logan, 126 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 
1939) (per curiam)). In light of the treatment of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as having 
content—demonstrated by the many decisions which claim to rest on this principle—defining 
motive so as to trivialize the maxim is an unacceptable outcome, unless there is no other choice. 
See, e.g., United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414, 419–24 (D. Kan. 1891) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that committing a prohibited act is lawful if done with a beneficent purpose).  
 95. This categorization is consistent with that of Elaine Chiu. See Elaine M. Chiu, The 
Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 664–66 (categorizing views 
of motive as (1) completely different from intent; (2) a sub-category of intent; or (3) a functional 
polymorphous category of action initiators, including both intentions and non-intentions). 
 96. Kaufman, supra note 92, at 322–23; see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 227 
(describing this view). 
 97. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 48 (1961). 
 98. See Hessick, supra note 6, at 94–95 (defining motives as a defendant’s “reasons for 
acting,” and explaining that intentions can also be motives). 
 99. Husak, supra note 13, at 7–8 (quoting Christine Sistare, Agent Motives and the Criminal 
Law, 13 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 303, 306 (1987)). 
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motives are also ulterior intended consequences. This shared 
characteristic ultimately requires the rejection of both types of 
definitions. 
1. These Definitions Render the Maxim Incoherent.  The maxim 
is incoherent under definitions that conflate motive and intention 
because they create a relative conception of motive such that motives 
and intentions do not differ in any context-independent way;100 one 
cannot identify any particular motive without specifying what 
behavior it is a motive for.101 The distinction between motive and 
intent is thus a relative one under this conception, a characterization 
Professor Glanville Williams accepts and defends: 
Much of what men do involves a chain of intention (D pulls the 
trigger of his revolver in order to make the bullet enter P’s body in 
order to kill P in order to get him out of the way etc.), and each 
intention is a motive for that preceding it.102 
Given that every intention is a motive for something else, Professor 
Husak concludes that the only intention that is not also a motive is 
the one “currently entertained by the defendant.”103 Husak criticizes 
this definition because the identity of something as a “motive” 
changes with time.104 
Husak’s argument can be taken even further to show that a 
relative conception of motive renders the irrelevance-of-motive 
maxim incoherent. Consider a statute that defines murder as 
purposely causing the death of another human being.105 Unlike the 
burglary example, which inquires into the ulterior purpose for which 
 
 100. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 144–45 (criticizing the relative nature of the 
motive/intention distinction). 
 101. Contrast this with the absolute conception of motive presented in Part I. If “stealing 
diamonds” is the intention with which a thief reached into the jewelry case, it does not 
transform into a motive when one seeks to explain why the thief broke into the house. Because 
motives and intentions are different sorts of things, the question of whether something is a 
motive or an intention has a single answer that does not vary with context. 
 102. See WILLIAMS, supra note 97, at 48 & n.2 and accompanying text (explaining that 
intention relates to the means of an action, whereas motive relates to the ends). 
 103. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 145. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The Model Penal Code suggests this approach. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1(1), 
210.2(1) (1962). 
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an action was done,106 this definition of murder inquires into whether 
the prohibited act—causing a person’s death—was purposeful. Thus, 
under the conception of motive as a more ulterior intention, motive is 
not relevant with regard to this statute.107 Now consider another 
hypothetical statute that defines murder as “performing any bodily 
act with the intention of causing the death of another human being, 
where the bodily act causes the death of that other human being.” 
This statute is functionally identical to the first murder statute, yet the 
second version references an ulterior intention in the same way a 
burglary statute does. Like burglary, the second statute inquires into 
the defendant’s ulterior intention for committing the prohibited act. 
Under this type of definition—that defines motive as a type of more 
ultimate intention—the question of whether motive is relevant to the 
offense of murder yields different answers depending on functionally 
irrelevant changes to a statute’s wording. 
Due to the relative nature of this view of motive as an ulterior 
intention, whether or not a statute involves motive becomes purely 
semantic. This renders the irrelevance-of-motive maxim incoherent.108 
Because there can be no answer to the question of whether crimes, 
such as murder, relate to motive, the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is 
neither true nor false. Its assertion simply does not make sense. In 
light of the longstanding history of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim, 
any definition that renders the maxim incoherent should be rejected if 
an alternate view that does not trivialize the maxim exists. 
2. These Definitions Render the Maxim Trivially False.  Even if 
the incoherency problem could somehow be solved, thus allowing the 
 
 106. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 228 (describing the view that crimes such as 
burglary—which require a mental state “beyond the defendant’s intent to do those acts or cause 
those consequences” defined in the statute—make relevant the defendant’s motive for doing 
those acts). 
 107. Some have claimed, however, that all specific intent crimes involve motives. See infra 
note 140. 
 108. Professor Frederick Lawrence makes a similar argument, stating two functionally 
identical descriptions of a bias crime, one that inquires beyond the defendant’s intention, and 
one that does not. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 108–09. The analogous argument, however, 
leads Lawrence to the opposite conclusion from the one defended in this Note. Because 
Lawrence considers only a single definition of motive—“the cause that drives the actor to 
commit the offense”—he concludes that the “distinction between intent and motive does not 
hold the weight that the Mitchell and Wyant state courts placed upon it . . . .” Id. at 108. When 
Hall’s definition is added to the list, however, Lawrence’s argument merely adds a reason to 
reject the nonsensical definition in favor of Hall’s. For a discussion of Mitchell and Wyant, see 
supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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maxim to at least make an empirical assertion, that assertion would 
be trivially false under these definitions of motive. The scheme of 
defining motive as a concept that overlaps that of intention must be 
rejected because it trivializes the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as 
incoherent or—if this incoherency problem could somehow be 
overcome—patently false, thus failing to make sense of the maxim’s 
long history of endorsement.109 
The view that motive is a type of ulterior intention renders the 
maxim false, as the maxim’s critics have proclaimed.110 If motive is a 
type of ulterior intention, then burglary statutes, as well as many 
other categories of crimes,111 demonstrate that motive is indeed 
relevant to criminal liability, in contravention to the maxim.112 Had 
the definition of motive been well settled, the fact that this type of 
definition renders the irrelevance-of-motive maxim false would be the 
end of the issue; critics of the maxim could simply express 
bewilderment as to why smart people reach such obviously wrong 
conclusions,113 and move on. When confronted with an alternative 
conception of motive that does not trivialize longstanding principles, 
however, the bewildering definition should be rejected. 
B. Embracing the Definitional Truth: Duff’s View 
Although Professor Antony Duff also defines motive as a 
concept that overlaps with intention, his novel defense of this type of 
definition deserves separate consideration. Although Duff is 
successful in defending the maxim’s truth, he does so only by so 
altering the maxim’s meaning that it refers to a separate principle 
 
 109. A successful distinction between motive and intention should at least make sense of 
why the maxim was so adamantly defended by criminal law theorists such as Professor Hall. See 
supra Part I.B. 
 110. See SALMOND, supra note 51, at 341–46 (writing in 1913 and identifying the simple 
truth that ulterior intentions are relevant to criminal liability). 
 111. See infra Part III.B.1–2 for an explanation of how inchoate crimes, and perhaps specific 
intent crimes, make reference to one’s ulterior intentions. 
 112. See SALMOND, supra note 51, at 346 (asserting that in crimes like burglary and forgery, 
“the ulterior intent is the source, in whole or in part, of the mischevious tendency of the act, and 
is therefore material in law”).  
 113. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 147–48 (citing the lack of “outcry” from orthodox theorists 
in response to the inclusion of offenses such as burglary and kidnapping, and defenses such as 
duress and necessity, to conclude that the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is not persuasive to 
orthodox theorists); Husak, supra note 13, at 13 n.1 (appending his citation to Hall’s book by 
saying, “I offer no hypothesis about why Hall’s thesis is so widely accepted among criminal 
theorists”). 
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altogether. Unlike the typical definitions of motive that conflate 
motive and intention, Duff defends a definition that renders the 
maxim true by definition.114 As many commentators have pointed out, 
one way to make the irrelevance-of-motive maxim true is by making 
it a definitional truth—defining “motive” as the subset of intentions 
that are irrelevant to criminal liability.115 For most theorists, this 
option does not represent a legitimate possibility.116 Duff, however, 
has attempted to defend the maxim along these lines. 
Of course, Duff has not found a way around the hard fact that a 
tautology has no empirical content. Rather, he construes the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim as having multiple dimensions of 
content, such that it can make a substantive claim about one issue 
while being true by definition along another dimension.117 Duff begins 
by defining motive in such a way as to make it “a definitional truth 
that anything which counts as a ‘motive’ is irrelevant to criminal 
liability, thus making the orthodox doctrine true by definition.”118 
Duff says it would be too hasty to dismiss this move as merely 
trivializing a substantive claim by rendering it true by definition.119 
Rather, “by portraying the orthodox doctrine as a definitional truth 
about the task of adjudication, we can see it as embodying a 
substantive doctrine about ‘the rule of law’, and the distinction 
between the tasks of legislation and of adjudication.”120 
To protect the maxim from tautological status, Duff restates the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim as holding “not that ‘motive’ is 
irrelevant to criminal liability, but that ‘further motive’ is irrelevant to 
liability.”121 He also clarifies that the maxim applies only to courts, 
and not to legislatures.122 Combining these steps, the statement 
“motive is irrelevant to criminal liability” is transformed into the 
 
 114. See Duff, supra note 11, at 174 (“[B]y portraying the orthodox doctrine as a definitional 
truth about the task of adjudication, we can see it as embodying a substantive doctrine about ‘the 
rule of law’, and the distinction between the tasks of legislation and of adjudication.”). 
 115. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146–47; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 229; Binder, supra 
note 3, at 45. 
 116. See, e.g, HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146–47 (describing such characterizations as 
“question-begging and unhelpful”); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 229 (calling this 
reasoning circular). 
 117. Duff, supra note 11, at 174. 
 118. Id. at 173. 
 119. Id. at 174. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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statement that motive [beyond those motives made relevant to 
criminal liability by the legislature] is irrelevant to criminal liability 
[in a judicial context]. 
From this foundation, Duff describes the content that the maxim 
retains, even though motive is defined by reference to criminal 
liability: 
The legislature defines crimes, by defining kinds of action that must 
count as criminal. Those definitions might include motivational 
factors . . . . [I]n deciding how particular crimes should be defined, 
legislatures will be asking what kinds of motive should make what 
kind of difference to criminal liability. 
Once the legislature has defined crimes, it is for the courts to apply 
those definitions to determine defendants’ criminal liability; and in 
doing so, they should attend only to the issue of whether the 
defendant’s actions matched the law’s definition of a crime.123 
Under Duff’s interpretation, the claim of the irrelevance-of-motive 
maxim is not about the types of mental states that are relevant for 
criminal liability. That claim is rendered true by definition. Rather, 
the maxim is about the rule of law and the distribution of power 
between legislatures and the courts. 
Although Duff’s conception of motive appeals to common sense 
and does not render the irrelevance-of-motive maxim false, it changes 
the meaning of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim in such a 
fundamental way that it refers to a separate principle of law 
altogether. In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with defining 
“motive” by reference to criminally irrelevant intentions, but doing so 
entails discussing a different concept than the one at issue in the 
debate over the irrelevance-of-motive maxim.124 One simply cannot 
resolve a debate by drastically redefining all the terms to remove the 
controversy. 
The relevant question in evaluating Duff’s view is whether his 
interpretations of “motive” and the irrelevance-of-motive maxim are 
consistent with the way these concepts have historically been 
discussed. If not, then Duff’s point about the respective roles of 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra Part I.A–B for an explanation of the meaning of the maxim to Stephen and 
Hall. 
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courts and legislatures125 should be understood as an interesting 
proposition, though an entirely distinct one from the irrelevance-of-
motive maxim. In defending his novel interpretation of the maxim, 
Duff does not seek historical support for it; rather, he offers a 
“justificatory” account for why the proposition is and should be 
true.126 Even if Duff succeeds in showing that he has translated a 
criticized maxim of orthodox criminal law into a descriptively true 
and normatively defensible principle, he has so altered the original 
maxim that he is discussing a new principle altogether.127 Despite 
Duff’s creative approach, in the end his view so alters the meaning of 
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as to make it something entirely 
different. 
In light of the inadequacy of these alternative definitions of 
motive, the term should properly be understood through Hall’s 
conception of motive as the reason one’s intended consequences are 
desirable. With this definition in mind, the truth of the maxim can be 
evaluated. 
III.  THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE IRRELEVANCE-OF-
MOTIVE MAXIM 
Evaluating the irrelevance-of-motive maxim’s truth requires first 
pinning down its assertion. Thus clarified, the maxim’s narrow 
claim—that motive is never directly doctrinally relevant to criminal 
liability—is still valid. 
A. Clarifying the Maxim’s Claim 
Following Professor Jerome Hall’s explanation, the statement 
that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability has a limited scope. Hall’s 
maxim does not claim motive is irrelevant to moral culpability; just 
 
 125. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text for an explanation of Duff’s 
interpretation of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as a statement about the proper roles of 
judges and legislators. 
 126. Duff, supra note 11, at 175–89 (emphasis removed). 
 127. Professor Binder reaches a similar conclusion: “Duff has replaced the maxim that 
motive is irrelevant to liability with the quite different maxim that legislatures alone should 
define offense elements and defenses. Having accepted the descriptive, logical, and normative 
objections to the irrelevance of motive maxim, he has essentially abandoned it.” Binder, supra 
note 3, at 94. 
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the opposite is true.128 Furthermore, the maxim does not claim motive 
is irrelevant in the entire justice system; in fact, Hall recommends 
administrative consideration of motive.129 Lastly, the maxim does not 
claim that evidence of motive is never relevant to determining 
criminal liability, just that it is never directly relevant. This last claim 
is essential for a defense of the maxim, and can be demonstrated by 
the following observations about the information conveyed by 
evidence of a defendant’s motives and by evidence of a defendant’s 
intentions. 
First, though a complete list of one’s intentions can rule out 
certain possible motives, many possibilities remain. For example, it is 
clear that Donny Defendant did not attempt to kill Victor Victim out 
of lust.130 Although it is possible to attempt a murder out of lust—such 
as when one believes a murder will impress a potential romantic 
interest—in such cases, one of the perpetrator’s intended 
consequences will relate to the motive of lust. According to the 
postulated facts of the Donny/Victor hypothetical, Donny’s only 
intended consequences were Victor’s injury and eventual death. His 
crime thus cannot possibly have satisfied a drive for lust. Donny’s 
motive for the attempted murder must have been one that could be 
satiated by the death of another, without reference to any further 
consequences. As explained in Part I.A.2, several possible motives fit 
this description. Thus, evidence demonstrating a defendant’s 
intentions can rule out some possible motives, but can leave many 
remaining options. This observation demonstrates the broader 
conclusion that information about one’s intentions can convey 
information about one’s motives.131 
Second, the converse is also true. Information about one’s 
motives conveys information about one’s intentions. If A kills B for 
the motive of “lust” one can infer that B’s death was not A’s ultimate 
 
 128. Hall argues that motive should be irrelevant to criminal liability even though he 
stresses that an evaluation of motive is essential to judgments of moral culpability. See supra 
notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (explaining that Hall prefers questions of 
motive to be examined on an administrative—not a doctrinal—level). 
 130. The Donny/Victor hypothetical is introduced in Part I.A.2. 
 131. This conclusion is implied by Gross’s point that the legislature can use intentions as a 
proxy for distinguishing between acts done from a particular motive. GROSS, supra note 92, at 
112 (“If murder for money or for vengeance is to be singled out, the proscribed act may be 
‘causing death of a person with intent to profit financially thereby’ or ‘with intent to avenge the 
death of another.’”). 
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intended consequence. Similarly, if a person commits a mugging with 
the motive of “greed,” it would be reasonable to infer that the 
mugger did not intend to choose a penniless victim. 
Third, because information about motive can convey information 
about intentions and vice versa, in certain circumstances, relevant 
legal questions can be answered by reference to either motive or to 
intent. Take the example of Paul, a police officer who lectures 
students on gun safety in his spare time. While demonstrating the use 
of a safety catch in a school auditorium, Paul pulls the trigger of his 
gun, shooting and killing a teacher whom he knew personally. Did 
Paul intend to kill the teacher? This question could be resolved by 
proof (assuming such proof is possible) that Paul’s only intentions in 
pulling the trigger were to depress the trigger, convey knowledge that 
a safety catch prevents a gun from firing, and decrease the rate of 
accidental firearm deaths in the community. If these were Paul’s only 
intended consequences, the shooting could not have been intentional. 
The same conclusion could also be reached, however, if it were 
proven that Paul’s motive in pulling the trigger was to “be a role 
model.” If, however, evidence showed that Paul did have a substantial 
motive to kill the teacher, if he stood to profit from her death or if she 
had broken his heart, it would add to the investigation and lend 
credibility to the argument that Paul intended to kill her while 
creating the appearance of an accident. Both information about 
Paul’s motives and information about Paul’s intentions could be 
sufficient to demonstrate that Paul did not intend to kill the teacher. 
Fourth, the fact that evidence of motive can provide information 
relevant to determining criminal liability does not make motive 
directly relevant to criminal liability.132 In the Paul hypothetical, 
notice that Paul’s motive is only indirectly relevant to liability. The 
reason Paul’s motive could be relevant in his murder trial is because 
his motive can shed light on his intentions. In this hypothetical, 
motive is thus relevant in the same unofficial way as it is in many 
 
 132. Cf. State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 104 (Conn. 1993) (“Words can be used to prove an 
intention to violate virtually any penal statute, however, and their use as evidence of crime does 
not transform a statute criminalizing conduct into a statute implicating protected 
communication. As the supreme court of Oregon pointed out in the context of that state’s ‘hate 
crimes’ statute, there is a distinction between ‘making speech the crime itself, or an element of 
the crime, and using speech to prove the crime.’” (quoting State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 
1992))). 
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criminal trials.133 If a defense attorney stresses to the jury that the 
prosecution has no evidence of motive, it is not because motive is an 
element of the crime, but to imply that the defendant had no reason 
to commit the crime, and therefore never did. This argument would 
fail in a case in which the prosecution presented indisputable 
evidence that the defendant committed the crime, even if the 
defendant’s reasons for doing so remained a mystery.134 In other 
words, evidence of motive might help the jury to speculate as to 
whether the defendant did the act, but motive is not directly 
relevant.135 The same is true in the example about Paul’s motive in 
pulling the trigger. 
Observations three and four are vital to the question of whether 
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is true. Though motives can be 
indirectly relevant to certain issues in criminal trials, the question 
posed by the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is whether motive qua 
motive is ever relevant to criminal liability.136 Stated more precisely, 
can different motives affect criminal liability when coupled with 
identical intentions?137 
 
 133. Hessick, supra note 6, at 89–90 (“Everyone who watches Law & Order knows (or 
thinks they know) that motive is very important in criminal justice. . . . Unlike in the television 
show, which places great emphasis on a defendant’s reasons for committing a crime, in the 
perceived real world of criminal liability, motive is just a bit player . . . . Evidence of a 
defendant’s motive may be introduced at trial to convince a jury that she is guilty, but motive is 
not perceived as a legal component of guilt.”). 
 134. See People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 452 (Cal. 1991) (“Motive here is, indeed, elusive. 
This was apparently a random killing for a reason known only to defendant . . . [but we] have 
never required the prosecution to prove a specific motive . . . . A senseless, random, but 
premeditated, killing supports a verdict of first degree murder.”). 
 135. See GROSS, supra note 92, at 103 (discussing the way that motives are presented as part 
of the prosecutor’s case even though motive is hardly ever a requirement for criminal liability). 
 136. See Husak, supra note 13, at 6 (“I am puzzled to understand what could be meant by 
claiming that, although the criminal law is concerned with motives, it is not concerned with them 
qua motives. Even if sense can be made of this reinterpretation, Hall’s thesis is rendered much 
less interesting, to say the least.”). 
 137. See HALL, supra note 2, at 88 (“[I]f the above writer meant to assert that all the above 
situations are alike except as regards the motives, in the usual sense, it can readily be shown that 
he was mistaken. . . . If the deceased was advancing on the defendant with drawn knife, saying, 
‘I’m going to kill you,’ and safe escape was impossible, it makes not the slightest difference 
whether the defendant hated his assailant or whether the assailant was his son whom he loved 
beyond measure.”). 
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B. Evaluating the Truth of the Maxim’s Claim 
Despite the array of crimes and defenses cited as examples of 
motive’s relevance,138 most of these examples relate to intentions, not 
motives. Although empirical criticisms of the maxim assert that 
motive is relevant to both criminal offenses and defenses, one 
approach to defending the maxim is to acknowledge motive’s 
relevance to defenses while explaining why the maxim’s claim only 
applies to criminal offenses.139 Although certain defenses intuitively 
seem to challenge the maxim, a careful application of the proper 
definition of motive reveals the maxim’s continued validity to all 
crimes save a certain category of bias crimes, which are discussed in 
Part III.B.3. 
1. Criminal Offenses.  In addition to mentioning criminal 
defenses, critics have claimed that motives are relevant to certain 
criminal offenses, such as specific intent crimes140 and inchoate 
crimes,141 because these crimes turn on the reason for the defendant’s 
action.142 This claim only follows, however, from an identification of 
motive with ulterior intentions. Once motive is understood as 
something altogether distinct from intentions, it is clear that motive is 
irrelevant to specific intent crimes and inchoate crimes such as 
criminal attempt. “In criminal attempts, the purpose to effect a 
 
 138. See infra Part III.B.1–2 for a discussion of specific intent crimes, inchoate crimes, self-
defense, necessity, and duress. 
 139. See Binder, supra note 3, at 48 (suggesting this approach). Used here, the term 
“criminal defenses” refers to those affirmative defenses that negate criminal liability even when 
the prosecutor establishes the elements of a criminal offense. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE 
art. 2 (1962) (discussing principles of liability), with id. at art. 3 (discussing principles of 
justification). 
 140. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 228 (describing the view that crimes such as 
burglary—which require a mental state “beyond the defendant’s intent to do those acts or cause 
those consequences” defined in the statute—make relevant the defendant’s motive for doing 
those acts); Husak, supra note 13, at 8 (defining motive as “specific intentions”). 
 141. See Binder, supra note 3, at 48–49 (recounting, with approval, Walter Hitchler’s 
argument that inchoate crimes, such as attempt and conspiracy, and partially inchoate crimes, 
such as burglary and robbery, use the actor’s purpose in committing the act to transform a legal 
act into a criminal one in the case of inchoate crimes, or a minor criminal offense into a serious 
one in the case of partially inchoate crimes, and thus concluding that these crimes make motive 
relevant). 
 142. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146 (“The reason why the defendant breaks and enters is 
crucial in characterizing his conduct as a burglary. Forgery, kidnapping, criminal libel, and 
conspiracy provide other examples, and the list could be expanded at great length.”); see also 
supra notes 140–41. 
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particular harm is not a motive; it is part of the plan, it implies 
intention.”143 As long as the person intended to commit the crime, it 
simply does not matter whether that person planned to do so for love 
or for money. 
The offense element of premeditation and deliberation provides 
a more interesting example, because it does not turn on a specific 
intention like criminal attempt does. As Professors Heidi M. Hurd 
and Michael S. Moore adeptly explain, however, premeditation does 
not turn on motive either: 
To determine that a defendant premeditated and deliberated about 
a killing simply requires a fact finder to find that the defendant 
formed the purpose to kill and contemplated the means by which to 
kill temporally in advance of the killing. In making this 
determination, it may be evidentially valuable to discover that the 
defendant hated the victim or had a motive to kill the victim, since if 
he did, he may well have thought about killing the victim. But as a 
matter of law, to find that a defendant premeditated and deliberated 
about a killing does not require the fact finder to discover the 
reasons for which the defendant intended to kill and deliberated 
about its means . . . .144 
At least excluding bias crimes,145 the irrelevance-of-motive 
maxim thus appears to be true with regard to criminal offenses. That 
is, bad motives are irrelevant. Professors Hurd and Moore reach this 
conclusion, but admit that “there are clearly defense doctrines that 
require courts to consider good, or at least exculpatory, motivations 
as bases for reducing or altogether suspending penalties for prima 
facie wrongdoing,” listing necessity, third-party self-defense, and the 
provocation/passion doctrine.146 The same type of reasoning Hurd and 
Moore invoke to dismiss the issue of premeditation, however, can 
demonstrate the irrelevance of motive in these criminal defenses as 
well. 
2. Criminal Defenses.  Some critics of the maxim argue that 
although inculpatory motives may not be relevant to criminal 
 
 143. HALL, supra note 2, at 86. 
 144. Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1120–21. 
 145. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 146. Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1119–20. 
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offenses, exculpatory motive are relevant to criminal defenses.147 In 
response to these arguments, defenders of the maxim could attempt 
to explain why only offenses should exclude motive. They could claim, 
for example, that offenses establish objective standards void of moral 
and political issues,148 “leaving a ‘technical’ core to the law.”149 
Peripheral doctrines of an entirely different nature could then resolve 
the inadequacies of this technical core, taking subjective differences, 
morality, and political issues into account. Regardless of whether such 
a distinction is defensible, it is unnecessary because motives are 
irrelevant to criminal defenses as well. 
Professor Jerome Hall explains motive’s irrelevance to the self-
defense doctrine: “If the deceased was advancing on the defendant 
with drawn knife, saying, ‘I’m going to kill you,’ and safe escape was 
impossible, it makes not the slightest difference whether the 
defendant hated his assailant or whether the assailant was his son 
whom he loved beyond measure.”150 As one court graphically put it: 
One may harbor the most intense hatred toward another; he may 
court an opportunity to take his life; may rejoice while he is 
imbruing his hands in his heart’s blood; and yet, if, to save his own 
life, the facts showed that he was fully justified in slaying his 
adversary, his malice shall not be taken into the account.151 
Recall that the irrelevance-of-motive maxim merely asserts that 
motives are not directly relevant.152 Even though “the solution of the 
question—was it self-defense or an unnecessary killing?—is 
sometimes aided by considering the motives of the accused,” this does 
not imply that motives like “hatred or revenge supersede[] the 
apparent necessity of the measures taken in self-defense.”153 
Just like the offense of burglary, the defenses of necessity and 
duress relate to intention, not motive.154 These defenses only apply if 
 
 147. See id. at 1119 (objecting to bias crimes as breaking “new ground in the development of 
criminal law doctrine” by making inculpatory motives relevant, even though exculpatory 
motives are already relevant). 
 148. See generally ALAN NORRIE, PUNISHMENT, RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUSTICE: A 
RELATIONAL CRITIQUE 142–93 (2000) (explaining, but ultimately rejecting, this view). 
 149. Id. at 192. 
 150. HALL, supra note 2, at 88. 
 151. Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527, 532 (1858). 
 152. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
 153. HALL, supra note 2, at 88. 
 154. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
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the prohibited act was committed “in order to avoid an unlawful 
threat of harm from another person,”155 or, in the case of necessity, 
avoid a greater harm.156 The doctrine of necessity protects inmates 
who escaped from prison under the mistaken belief that their lives 
were in danger,157 but it is of no assistance to prisoners who escaped in 
ignorance of a real, life-threatening fire.158 This relevance of the 
actor’s purposes raises an issue of ulterior intentions, not motives. As 
long as the prisoner’s escape served the intention of “avoiding the 
fire,” it matters not whether this intention was valuable for self-
preservation or for gluttony—if, for example, a death row inmate 
cared about survival only as a means to allow the inmate to enjoy the 
last meal. 
None of these supposed examples of motive’s relevance pose a 
problem for the irrelevance-of-motive maxim, properly construed. 
This result is a predictable one. Because the proponents of the view 
that motive is relevant define “motive” as some form of ulterior 
intention, their examples relate to instances in which ulterior 
intentions are relevant to criminal liability. Given that motive has 
been shown to be altogether distinct from intention, however, these 
examples say nothing of the relevance of motive. 
One might criticize the foregoing method of analysis for 
dismissing any offense or defense that can be described using 
intention terms rather than motive terms. This approach, however, is 
exactly what Professor Hall’s thesis calls for. “[T]he technique of 
restating such cases in conformity with the principle of mens rea 
[rather than motive] is to articulate the relevant criminal intention 
and state the decision in terms of that. This, unfortunately, has not 
always been done by the courts.”159 At least excluding bias crimes, 
motivations are never directly relevant to criminal liability. 
3. Bias Crimes.  Although this Note takes no position as to the 
ultimate issues in the bias crime debate, it seeks to reframe that 
discussion by revealing the unique nature of bias crimes. Bias crime 
 
 155. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146. 
 156. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 229. 
 157. Id. at 229 & n.19; see id. at 446 (“[I]f A kills B reasonably believing it to be necessary to 
save C and D, he is not guilty of murder even though, unknown to A, C and D could have been 
rescued without the necessity of killing B.”). 
 158. See id. at 446 (“If A kills his enemy B for revenge, and he later learns to his happy 
surprise that by killing B he saved the lives of C and D, A has no defense to murder.”). 
 159. HALL, supra note 2, at 91–92. 
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statutes are not, as some commentators have suggested, simply one 
additional instance in which the criminal law considers motive.160 For 
better or for worse, certain bias crimes represent a drastic doctrinal 
departure from a longstanding maxim of criminal law.161 This Section 
first identifies the subcategory of bias crimes that inculpate motives 
and then discusses the empirical relevance of this subcategory. 
Professor Frederick Lawrence has identified two “analytically 
distinct” categories of bias crime statutes: the discriminatory selection 
model and the racial animus model.162 “The discriminatory selection 
model of bias crimes defines these crimes in terms of the 
perpetrator’s discriminatory selection of his victim. Under this model, 
it is irrelevant why an offender selected his victim on the bases of race 
or group; it is sufficient that the offender did so.”163 Whether the 
offender chose the victim on the basis of race is a question of 
intentions.164 If the offender assaulted a black victim, the question is 
whether the offender had the intention of assaulting “a black person” 
or whether the offender merely intended to assault “a person.” 
Motive is thus irrelevant to the discriminatory selection model of bias 
crimes. 
The racial animus model, however, “defines crimes on the basis 
of the perpetrator’s animus for the racial or ethnic group of the victim 
and the centrality of this animus in the perpetrator’s motivation for 
committing the crime.”165 A statute would fall into the racial animus 
model if it requires ill will, hatred, bias, or “some measure of hostility 
toward the victim’s racial group and/or toward the victim because he 
is part of that group.”166 Unlike every other crime considered thus far, 
this type of bias crime statute does make motive qua motive relevant. 
A hypothetical scenario shows that this model will distinguish, on the 
basis of motive, between two defendants with identical intentions. 
 
 160. See Janine Young Kim, Hate Crime Law and the Limits of Inculpation, 84 NEB. L. REV. 
846, 852–55 (2006) (citing examples of motive’s relevance). 
 161. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1119 (2004) (objecting to hate crimes as breaking 
“new ground in the development of criminal law doctrine”). 
 162. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 29–30 (1999). Regardless of whether the bias crime 
provision constitutes a separate offense or merely creates a sentencing enhancement criterion, it 
nevertheless becomes an “essential element of the offense.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 495 (2000). 
 163. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 30. 
 164. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1124 (explaining how statutes that avoid 
reference to hate or bias altogether are analogous to traditional specific intent crimes). 
 165. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 30. 
 166. Id. at 34–35. 
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Imagine a person, Alan, with an unusual resistance to change—
whenever he chooses between alternatives that are otherwise equally 
desirable, Alan likes to choose whichever option is more familiar. 
Now meet Bob, an individual with a strong dislike for black people. 
One day, both Alan and Bob participate in an identical sequence of 
events. They both feel hungry and decide to seek out some money for 
food. Having none, Bob and Alan both resolve to mug a stranger. 
They each walk to a quiet street that has periodic passersby of both 
white and black races. They both make a conscious choice to mug a 
black victim, though for different reasons. Because Alan had only 
committed one mugging before this time, and because his previous 
victim happened to be black, Alan decides to choose another black 
victim simply for the sake of consistency. Bob, however, chooses a 
black victim because of his prejudice. 
The two offenders committed the respective muggings with 
identical intended consequences. They both intended to mug a black 
person, obtain money from the victim, buy food, and eat food. What 
differentiates the two is the reason why their intended consequence of 
mugging a black person was valuable to them. Because both 
offenders had the specific intention of mugging a person of a 
particular race, the discriminatory selection model of bias crime laws 
would treat both of these individuals as bias crime offenders. Under 
the racial animus model, however, only Bob committed a bias crime. 
This example demonstrates how under the racial animus model, 
motive is directly relevant to bias crimes. This apparent contravention 
of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim raises the question of how 
common the racial animus model is. Although the racial animus 
model has been identified as “the one that bias crime scholars and law 
enforcement agencies most typically adopt,”167 it is hardly ever 
enacted. For example, Professor Lawrence claims that Massachusetts 
follows the racial animus model based on a statutory definition that 
“[h]ate [c]rime[s]” are “any criminal act coupled with overt actions 
motivated by bigotry and bias.”168 This statutory definition, however, 
applies only to the collection and dissemination of hate crime data.169 
 
 167. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted). 
 168. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32 (1997), reprinted in FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, 
PUNISHING HATE app. C, at 191 (1999) (internal quotations omitted). 
 169. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32–35 (2007) (applying the definitions in section 32 
only to sections 33 through 35, which concern hate crime data). 
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The state’s criminal law contains no such requirement.170 Racial 
animus model statutes have been repealed in New Jersey171 and 
Maryland172 in favor of discriminatory selection model versions. 
Even when statutes do appear to enact the racial animus model, 
judges can interpret them in a way that takes the bias out of “bias 
crimes” by transforming them into discriminatory selection model 
statutes. In State v. Stalder,173 the Supreme Court of Florida sought to 
construe a bias crime statute narrowly, so that it only covered crimes 
“committed because of prejudice.”174 By referencing prejudice in this 
way, the court thus described a crime that invokes a defendant’s 
motives.175 The court then defined a “bias-motivated crime” as “any 
crime wherein the perpetrator intentionally selects the victim because 
of the victim’s race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin.”176 In 
so doing, the court stripped the motive element from the statute by 
determining the existence of prejudice by reference to the 
defendant’s intended consequences. 
This type of judicial interpretation was foreseen by Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen, who explained how motive-laden terminology “is 
 
 170. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (2007) (requiring an “intent to intimidate [the 
victim] because of such person’s race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation”). 
 171. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (1994) (enhancing a sentence if “[t]he 
defendant in committing the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward, and 
with a purpose to intimidate, an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, 
religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” (emphasis added)) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) 
(1999) (“The defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an 
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation or ethnicity.”), and Act of Jan. 11, 2002, ch. 443, 2001 N.J. ALS 443 (codified as N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:16-1 (2002)) (repealing § 2C:44-3(e) and creating a separate offense that 
prohibits the commission of certain other crimes “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, or 
ethnicity”). 
 172. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A(b)(4)(ii)(2) (1996) (repealed 2002) 
(requiring, in some cases, “evidence that exhibits animosity on the part of the person 
committing the act against a person or group because of that person’s or group’s race, color, 
religious beliefs, or national origin” (emphasis added)), with MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-
304 (2007) (requiring only that property be destroyed because of another’s “race, color, 
religious beliefs, or national origin”). 
 173. State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994). 
 174. Id. at 1076. 
 175. A bias crime statute that requires prejudice does invoke defendants’ motives, whereas a 
statute would not invoke defendants’ motives if it merely required that the victim’s race, 
ethnicity, etc. play a factor in the perpetrator’s selection of the victim . See supra notes 160–66 
and accompanying text. 
 176. Stalder, 630 So. 2d at 1077 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1989)). 
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always evaded by legal fictions.”177 Although bias crimes following the 
racial animus model are still on the books,178 the relevant question is 
whether such laws will take defendants’ motives into account, or 
whether, as Stephen predicted, they will ultimately be understood in 
terms of intentions. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming that bias crimes do continue to involve motives qua 
motives, the foregoing examination of the irrelevance-of-motive 
maxim shows just how unique such crimes would be. Consider 
Professors Hurd and Moore’s claim in their 2004 article that bias 
crimes are breaking “new ground in the development of criminal law 
doctrine.”179 Because they did not defend the irrelevance of motive 
more generally,180 however, their important conclusion has already 
been trivialized. Professor Janine Young Kim construes Hurd and 
Moore’s argument as merely showing that bias crimes involve motives 
in a slightly different way than the way in which other crimes involve 
motives.181 This Note has reached the same conclusion regarding bias 
crimes as Hurd and Moore did, but has presented it in a broader 
context—demonstrating that racial animus model bias crimes are not 
simply a new application of motive, but the single exception to a 
longstanding maxim of criminal law. Although arguments can be 
made that regardless of whether it is typical to take motives into 
account, bias crimes should do so, the foregoing discussion 
demonstrates the need for scholars to make such arguments if they 
are to defend bias crime statutes. Bias crime statutes are not just 
another variety of crime; they differ in a fundamental way from the 
balance of the criminal law. 
This conclusion about the uniqueness of bias crimes only follows 
once the term “motive” is understood to refer to something distinct 
from “intention.” Although critics of the irrelevance-of-motive 
 
 177. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 121. Stephen’s claim is discussed in more detail supra in the 
text accompanying notes 44–45. 
 178. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(f) (2007) (providing a sentence enhancement for 
defendants who were “substantially motivated to commit the crime because of hostility towards 
the victim’s religion, race, creed, sexual orientation, . . . national origin or sex”). 
 179. Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1119. 
 180. See id. at 1120 (discussing examples in which exculpatory, but not inculpatory, motives 
are relevant rather than defending the irrelevance-of-motive maxim in its entirety). 
 181. See Kim, supra note 160, at 852–55. 
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maxim are correct that no context-independent, logical distinction 
can be drawn between criminal intentions and more ultimate 
intentions, this does not disprove the maxim. Rather, it demonstrates 
the need to reject this conception of motive altogether in favor of any 
plausible alternative. The alternative defended here is not only 
plausible, it is in line with the view articulated by Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen in the nineteenth century, and is the very conception 
defended by Professor Jerome Hall, the theorist to whom the 
irrelevance-of-motive maxim is often attributed.182 Once what Hall 
calls the “usual distinction between intention and motive”183 is 
accepted, it appears that motives—with the possible exception of 
motives in racial animus model bias crimes—are indeed irrelevant to 
criminal liability. 
 
 182. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 13, at 4–6 (labeling the assertion that motive is irrelevant in 
the criminal law “Hall’s thesis”). 
 183. HALL, supra note 2, at 86 (referring to the view he defends). 
